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SERBIAN EASTERN ORTHODOX DIOCESE V.
MILIVOJEVICH: THE CONTINUING CRUSADE FOR
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Because of the constitutional right to religious freedom and the
doctrine of separation of church and state, civil courts have been
reluctant to decide cases involving religious disputes. When the
issues concern civil or property rights rather than purely intrade-
nominational controversies, however, courts have been more willing
to resolve church conflicts.' In deciding whether to entertain a reli-
gious controversy, the Supreme Court has emphasized factors such
as the power structure of the particular church and the pertinent
property issues, including trust provisions in the deeds to church
property. In adjudicating these conflicts, the Court has attempted
to balance the competing interests of governmental and spiritual
institutions as well as the rights of private parties.'
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich is the most
recent Supreme Court case examining the proper relationship be-
tween church and state. In Serbian Diocese the Court considered
the boundaries of civil court intervention in a hierarchical church's
ecclesiastical determinations of matters affecting civil and property
rights. This Comment will analyze that opinion in light of prior
Supreme Court decisions and discuss its effect on future church and
state controversies.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE: THE ROLE OF CHURCH POLITY AND PROPERTY TRUSTS
During the developing years of the American colonies, separation
of church and state was a foreign concept to English courts. Simi-
larly, it was nonexistent in the colonial United States; conditions
here, however, presaged the adoption and development of this prin-
ciple.' Although in America the doctrine of church and state separa-
1. See generally W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE
MODERN INTERPRETATION 173 (1974); C. ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 298 (2d ed. 1933)
(hereinafter cited as C. ZOLLMAN].
2. Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over Religious Issues, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 508, 508-
09 (1959).
3. 96 S. Ct. 2372 (1976), rehearing denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976).
4. See Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HAmv.
L. REv. 1142, 1149-54 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Intervention].
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tion evolved rapidly, many early American courts applied an im-
plied trust theory, the English approach, to resolve property dis-
putes within a religious organization.' The English implied trust
theory, as first pronounced in Craigdallie v. Aikman' and in
Attorney General v. Pearson,7 created a legal fiction whereby, in a
church dispute, the use of property would be granted to the faction
most consistently following the faith as expressed by the church
founders. The number of adherents was irrelevant. The trust-that
property devoted to a particular purpose-could not be frustrated
by majority rule.' This doctrine, together with other concepts affect-
ing the separation of church and state, first was addressed by the
United States Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones.9
Watson was the result of a post-Civil War schism in the Presby-
terian Church, a schism kindled by the slavery issue. Dissension was
manifest in all levels of the hierarchical church,"0 as various conflict-
5. The middle and southern states were particularly responsive to the implied trust theory.
See Sampen, Civil Courts, Church Property, and Neutral Principles: A Dissenting View, 1975
U. ILL. L.F. 543, 548, 551.
6. 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813) (Scot.). Craigdallie, the first reported English case con-
cerning internal church property battles, was a dispute over the purchase of a chapel by a
faction withdrawing from the established church of Scotland in 1737. Lord Eldon's use of the
implied trust theory resulted in a decision for the minority religious body against the secession
church, because the latter had deviated from the doctrine espoused by the church founders.
7. 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch. 1817). Pearson also involved an internal church dispute over the
use of church property. Lord Eldon, again seeking the original intent of the founders, held
for the minority. The original conveyance, executed in 1701, encouraged continued belief in
the concept of the Holy Trinity. In 1701, the church members all had been trinitarians; by
1817, however, the majority faction was utilitarian.
8. See Sampen, supra note 5, at 549-50; Judicial Intevention, supra note 4, at 1145-46;
Comment, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constitutional
Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1116-17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Church Property
Disputes].
9. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
10. Hierarchical churches are those in which church authority reposes either in ascending
levels of adjudicatory bodies (presbyterian hierarchies) or in sublime clergy, such as bishops
and popes (episcopal hierarchies). In contrast, congregational churches are characterized by
autonomous local congregations that govern themselves without control by a higher church
body. See Judicial Intervention, supra note 4, at 1143-44. Examples of hierarchical churches
of the presbyterian variety include the Presbyterian, Methodist, and some Lutheran
churches. The episcopal type includes the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches.
Congregational churches are exemplified by the following churches: Baptist, Disciples of
Christ, Quakers, and Churches of Christ. Id. See also Comment, Constitutional Law-
Church Property Disputes-First Amendment Prohibits Judicial Examination of Ecclesias-
tical Matters, 54 IowA L. REV. 899, 901 nn.11 & 14 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Judicial
Examination].
In the Presbyterian Church, the hierarchy includes, in ascending order, the Church Session
(consisting of the pastor and church elders who guide and control the local church); the
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ing factions attempted to dictate church policy on the slavery ques-
tion. In Louisville, Kentucky, the doctrinal differences produced a
total fissure within the congregation of the local church; when each
side demanded exclusive use of the church property," a state court
action was filed. After protracted litigation, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held for the proslavery faction, a group comprising a mi-
nority of the congregation yet, at the time of the schism, a majority
of both the Church Session and the Trustees. 3 By invoking diversity
of citizenship, the antislavery faction successfully brought suit in
federal court. 4 After holding the case under advisement for a year,
the Supreme Court affirmed. 5
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court noted the hierarchical
formation of the church as well as the antislavery pronouncements
made by the highest ecclesiastical body. The Court held that such
pronouncements, if involving questions of a religious nature, are
binding on the civil courts." Moreover, the court deemed impermis-
sible the Kentucky court's scrutiny of the church's principles under
the guise of examining the higher tribunal's authority, for, to allow
civil courts to resolve religious disputes merely because property
rights are affected would divest church bodies of the authority to
interpret their own rules. 7 This language abrogated the English
Presbytery (composed of all ministers of a district together with an elder from each of the
congregations, the Presbytery controls local churches within a given district); the Synod
(which controls the local churches within a larger district and handles appeals from Presby-
teries); and the General Assembly (the ultimate adjudicating body in the Presbyterian
Church). Also associated with the local church in Watson were the Trustees, three men who,
though lacking ecclesiastical functions, held legal title to the church property. 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 681-82.
11. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 681.
12. Avery v. Watson, 2 Bush. 336 (Ky. 1867).
13. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 684-92. Both sides found support in the Church's higher echelons.
The General Assembly, the highest adjudicatory authority of the Presbyterian Church, had
officially denounced the proslavery position, while both the Louisville Presbytery and the
Kentucky Synod had divided internally over the issue. Id.
14. As local church members residing across the Ohio River in Indiana, the petitioners
invoked diversity jurisdiction to bring the action in federal court. Because neither the parties
nor the issue was the same in state and federal courts, jurisdiction was granted. Unlike the
Supreme Court, which sought to identify the representative faction of the church, the Ken-
tucky courts had ascertained only who the elders of the local congregation were. Id. at 714-
18.
Moreover, as it predated Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Watson was based
on federal common law rather than on state law as applied by the highest state court. See
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952).
15. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 735.
16. Id. at 727.
17. Id. at 733.
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implied trust theory in that the decisions of hierarchical church
bodies, rather than the original intent of church founders, were
determinative. Ultimately, the doctrine of separation of church and
state was the factor distinguishing this outcome from the positions
taken in the English cases."8
Limits to this new rule were discernible in the Watson opinion.
Reiterating that the terms of a trust deed to church property may
not be implied by civil courts, the Court noted, however, that courts
could enforce terms of an express trust." The Court further stated
that conflicts involving a congregational church, as opposed to a
hierarchical church, would be resolved by the rules of the congrega-
tion, whether those rules vest adjudicatory power in the majority of
members or in a group of elders.20 Thus, the decision in Watson was
limited to the disputes of hierarchical churches lacking explicit pro-
visions in their property trusts.2'
Watson's general rule has not been overruled, but the Court soon
reexamined and partially modified it. In Bouldin v. Alexander,22 a
dispute involving a congregational church, the possessory right to
church property was again at issue. Two conflicting groups of trus-
tees, each with a following of church members, claimed to represent
the church.3 Although the Court in Bouldin adopted the basic ap-
18. Id. at 727-28. Although Watson was not based explicitly on first amendment grounds,
Justice Miller's opinion reflected the influence of the doctrine of separation of church and
state: "The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establish-
ment of no sect." Id. at 728. "The structure of our government has, for the preservation of
civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. . . .[I]t has
secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority." Id. at 730, quoting Harmon
v. Dreher, 2 Speer's Equity 87.
19. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722-23. An express trust is one "created or declared in express
terms, and usually in writing ... "; an implied trust is "raised or created by implication of
law; a trust implied or presumed from circumstances." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1681 (4th
ed. rev. 1968).
20. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722, 724-25. For a discussion of the differences between hierarchi-
cal and congregational churches, see note 10 supra.
21. Id. at 733-34. For further discussion of the Watson decision and its effect on later cases,
see C. ZOLLMAN, supra note 1 (criticizes the Watson approach); Casad, Church Property
Litigation: A Comment on the Hull Church Case, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 44 (1970); Sampen,
supra note 5; Judicial Intervention, supra note 4; Judicial Examination, supra note 10;
Church Property Disputes, supra note 8 (endorses the Watson approach).
22. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
23. The Third Baptist Church began in the form of small prayer gatherings led by respon-
dent Bouldin. As the attendance grew, Bouldin, who acted as both pastor and treasurer,
purchased property, with the deed in his own name, and had the church built. After some
dissension, Bouldin conveyed much of the land to four trustees. Eventually, the congregation
adopted rules whereby seven trustees were to be elected each January, or if not then, "at the
[Vol. 18:655
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proach of the Watson dictum that the majority faction of a congre-
gational church represents the church, it qualified this general rule
by requiring that the majority adhere to the rules and tenets of the
faith. In such circumstances a minority's efforts to remove the ma-
jority are without authority.2' To ascertain the alignment of the
congregation, however, the Court in Bouldin necessarily examined
the existence and validity of various internal matters. 5 In effect,
then, the Court sanctioned marginal civil court review of ecclesiasti-
cal determinations in certain situations, but failed to enumerate the
requisite circumstances.
In the first post-Watson hierarchical church case considered by
the Supreme Court, Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop,2 1 the
controversy was over a collative chaplaincy.21 The petitioner
claimed the right to a chaplaincy appointment as the nearest male
descendant of the chaplaincy's founder. Under the Canon law appl-
icable at the time the deed founding the chaplaincy was executed,28
Gonzalez could have been appointed as a chaplain validly, but ac-
cording to the more recent rules, he was ineligible because of his
age.2s Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Brandeis de-
next regular meeting for business." Seven trustees were elected. But Bouldin maintained that
the election never occurred, and with a following of about fifteen members, elected four
trustees in their place. The dissident minority then "turned out" the remaining forty-one
members of the Church. This action for the possession of the church followed. Id. at 132-35.
24. Id. at 140.
25. The Court undertook an examination of the Baptist Church Manual, for example, to
determine the number and method of electing trustees. Conflicting testimony as to the valid-
ity of the minutes, as well as the minute book, was admitted into evidence to ascertain
whether the election had occurred. Id. at 138. The Court also considered "persuasive," though
not binding, the Philadelphia Baptist Association's recognition of the majority as the "Third
Colored Baptist Church." Id. at 139.
26. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
27. A chaplaincy is created by an individual who wishes to have a designated number of
masses celebrated each year. It may be either in the form of a "lay chaplaincy," whereby
ecclesiastical intervention is unnecessary, or a "collative chaplaincy," in which ordination by
a spiritual authority is required. Id. at 10 n.1.
28, The chaplaincy was founded in 1820 according to the will of Dofla Tuzman. Id. at 11.
29, When the trust was initiated in 1820, a potential chaplain had to satisfy the qualifica-
tions established by the Council of Trent, which provided, inter alia, that an appointee be at
least fourteen years old. Gonzalez; who was not yet twelve when the suit was brought,
amended his complaint to conform to the requirement upon attaining age 14. But Codex Juris
Canonici, adopted in 1917 and effective the following year, precluded a chaplaincy appoint-
ment to one who had not received a bachelor's degree and begun the study of theology. Id. at
11-15.
In addition to the appointment, Gonzalez sought to recover the surplus income that had
accumulated during the fourteen year vacancy of the chaplaincy. The trial court, after enter-
ing judgment for Gonzalez, found that amount to be 173,725 pesos or $86,862.50. Id. at 10-
11.
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ferred to the ecclesiastical authorities of the hierarchical Roman
Catholic Church, affirming the Archbishop's determinations as to
the qualifications and appointment of a particular candidate. 0
Seemingly, the decision endorsed the Watson rule of judicial de-
ference to decisions of hierarchical churches' governing bodies.' The
suggestion in Bouldin that civil courts properly might review eccle-
siastical decisions in certain situations was embraced and eluci-
dated, however, in Gonzalez: decisions of religious tribunals, even
those affecting civil rights, are binding on courts "[i]n the absence
of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness. '3 As the facts before the Court
evidenced no fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness 3 3 the addition of these
qualifiers was dictum. Nonetheless, they introduced a "due pro-
cess" element into the resolution of church disputes, implying that
church tribunals must follow their own rules in "good faith" or be
subject to secular intervention.34
Although the Gonzalez opinion was not based on first amendment
grounds, the petitioner maintained that he was being deprived of a
constitutional right. 35 The Court did not answer that argument, but
the invocation of the Constitution foreshadowed an argument later
confronting the Court. Nearly twenty-five years later, the Supreme
Court specifically analyzed the doctrine of the separation of church
and state in a constitutional context. In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral,31 a statutorily-created corporation37 sought to enforce
30. Id. at 16.
31. The implied trust theory, which had survived despite Watson, was again undermined.
Because Watson applied only to federal courts, however, many state courts had rejected the
Court's rejection of the theory. Sampen, supra note 5, at 551.
32. 280 U.S. at 16.
33. After carefully examining the facts, the Court noted that there was "not even a
suggestion that the Archbishop exercised his authority arbitrarily." Id. at 18.
34. See Church Property Disputes, supra note 8, at 1119-20.
35. 280 U.S. at 15. The opinion does not clarify which constitutional right allegedly was
infringed. The Court noted only that Gonzalez "contends that to deprive him of his alleged
right to the chaplaincy. . . would violate the Constitution of the United States." Id.
36. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). Prior to Kedroff, courts had expressed reluctance to enter church
property conflicts more because of the doctrine of separation of church and state than because
of specific first amendment guarantees. See Church Property Disputes, supra note 8, at 1113.
37. The pertinent article, Article 5-C of the Religious Corporations Law of New York,
provided for both the incorporation and the government of the Russian Orthodox Churches.
344 U.S. at 97. Since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Supreme Church Authority in
the Soviet Union, which is the administrative head of the hierarchical church, had permitted
the American branch significant independence. The autonomy it had granted, however, was
not as complete as its United States' members had desired and demanded. So, to acquire a
church religiously affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, the New
York legislature provided a statutory grant to incorporate. Id. at 101-05.
[Vol. 18:655
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right of the Archbishop of New York38 to use and occupy a
Russian Orthodox cathedral in New York. 39 It was challenged by
another Archbishop who based his right of possession on an appoint-
ment given by the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church in Moscow. After protracted litigation in the state
courts, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the state statute that
transferred administrative control from the Soviet-based general
church to the American church officials.40
In an opinion written by Justice Reed, the Supreme Court re-
versed New York's highest court. Again invoking the hierarchical
church test established by Watson" that ecclesiastical pronounce-
ments of the supreme adjudicatory bodies of hierarchical churches
bind the civil courts-the Justice outlined the history of the Russian
Orthdox Church. 2 Clearly, the Supreme Church Authority pos-
sessed the authority to choose the cleric governing the North Ameri-
can branch of the church prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. More-
over, the spiritual authorities had not relinquished that power,
nor had they accorded the American church full independence . 3
Under the Watson test, then, the hierarchical nature of the church
mandated that the courts defer to the determination of the "eccle-
siastical government.""
Although precedent did not require it, the Kedroff Court tran-
scended Watson and based its decision on constitutional grounds,"
38. The Archbishop of New York was elected by a convention of the American churches.
344 U.S. at 96 & n.1.
39. Although the corporation previously had been granted title to the property, the Russian
general church maintained the possessory interest and thus was able to control the use and
occupation of the cathedral. Id. at 95-96 & n.1.
40. See St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950).
41. Again, the implied trust theory was undermined. Indeed, the Court only briefly referred
to the "trust" issue. After noting that the Court of Appeals had based its decision on the
theory that the religious trust would be carried out more faithfully by the corporation, Justice
Reed succinctly declared: "An enactment by a legislature cannot validate action which the
Constitution prohibits, and we think that the statute here in question passes the constitu-
tional limits. ... 344 U.S. at 106-07.
42. Id. at 100-05.
43. Id. at 105-06.
44. Id. at 115. In its application of the Watson test, the Court noted summarily the
Gonzalez qualifications of fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness and implied that they were not
at issue. Id. at 116.
45. Although Watson did not specifically invoke the Constitution, the opinion discussed
constitutional concepts. As Justice Reed noted in Kedroff:
The [Watson] opinion radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organiza-
tions, . . . [granting them] power to decide for themselves, free from state
1977]
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holding that the New York statute, which in effect denied the
Church the choice of its hierarchy, prevented the "free exercise of
religion" in violation of the first amendment as applied to the states
by the fourteenth. Such a legislative fiat was impermissible regard-
less of allegedly harmful political entanglements 7 or the involve-
ment of property rights incident to ecclesiastical decisions."
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence49 further elaborated on the
menace of governmental interference in religious controversies. As
he observed, situations exist in which questions of property can be
divorced sufficiently from the theological conflicts so as to permit
and even demand settlements by the courts. Under these circum-
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doc-
trine.
Id. at 116.
46. Id. at 119. In a number of earlier cases, the Court had applied the first amendment to
the states by way of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
310 (1952); Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1948); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 248-49, 262
(1934). See also Judicial Intervention, supra note 4, at 1156; Judicial Exartination, supra
note 10, at 900.
In pertinent part, the United States Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; . . ." U.S. CONST. Amend. I.
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. The Court narrowed the issue to a determination of who was entitled to use the St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. at 115, discussing only briefly the alleged hazardous political
embroilment that had been integral to the lower court's decision and to Justice Jackson's
dissent. The Court of Appeals of New York had concluded that the Moscow Patriarchate had
"become a tool of the Soviet Government primarily designed to implement its foreign policy."
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 302 N.Y. 1, 33, 96 N.E.2d 56, 74 (1950). Similarly, Justice
Jackson did not believe that New York should be forced to "yield to the authority of a foreign
and unfriendly state masquerading as a spiritual institution." 344 U.S. at 131.
In its notations of the controversy's political overtones, the Court primarily addressed the
administrative problems resulting from the historical upheavals in the Mother Church's
country: "The Russian turmoil ... made very difficult Russian administration of the Amer-
ican diocese . . . . That (American separatist) movement brought about the arrangements
* . * for a temporary American administration of the church on account of the disturbances
in Russia." Id. at 103 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied).
The Court noted only secondarily the alleged subversive characteristics of the religious
dispute that precipitated the state action. "Legislative power to punish subversive action
cannot be doubted. If such action should be actually attempted by a cleric, neither his robe
nor his pulpit would be a defense." Id. at 109-10. Here, no subversive action on the part of
the clergy had been charged. Id.
48. 344 U.S. at 109-10, 120-21.
49. Id. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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stances, however, the realm of judicial authority is circumscribed
narrowly, and at all times is in "strict subordination to the eccle-
siastical law of a particular church."50 As for legislatures, they have
"no such obligation . . . and no such power" to resolve disputes of
a religious nature."
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Pres-
byterian Church,5 decided in 1969, concerned another dispute over
church property rights. Two local churches withdrew from the hier-
archical structure of the Presbyterian Church,53 alleging that the
general church had violated its own constitution and had departed
from the original tenets and rules. Without recourse to higher
church tribunals, the dissident churchmen brought suit in state civil
courts to enjoin the general church from trespassing on the petition-
ers' property.54
Applying state common law, the Georgia court held that the
"departure from doctrine" test, an element of the "implied trust"
theory of Craigdallie and Pearson, mandated a judgment for the
local congregations, in that the jury's verdict implied a finding that
the general church had deviated from the doctrines it had espoused
when the local churches joined the Presbyterian Church.5 5 Speaking
through Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
valid state interest in adjudicating property conflicts. The Court
emphasized, however, that whenever the resolution of property dis-
putes implicated ecclesiastical controversies, the courts' adjudica-
tory powers were strictly limited.56 Watson apparently had under-
mined the "implied trust" doctrine in the United States, and nei-
50. Id. at 122.
51. Id. Apparently, Justice Frankfurter's words were not heeded; after the Court remanded
for retrial, the New York Court of Appeals held once more for the American faction. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 164 N.E.2d 687, 196 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1960).
Again, the Supreme Court reversed. In a per curiam opinion governed by Kedroff, the Court
precluded not only the legislature, but also the judiciary, from interfering with "free exer-
cise." Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960).
52. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
53. For a discussion of the hierarchical Presbyterian Church see note 10 supra.
54. The local churches alleged, inter alia, that the general church departed from doctrine
by ordaining women as ministers and ruling elders, by advocating the removal of Bible
reading and prayers by children in the public schools, and by making public statements on
issues such as the Vietnam conflict. Id. at 441 n.1, quoting Presbyterian Church v. Eastern
Heights Presbyterian Church, 224 Ga. 61, 62-63, 159 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1968). Title to the
property was in the local churches. 393 U.S. at 443.
55. 393 U.S. at 443-44.
56. Id. at 445-46.
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ther the Gonzalez exceptions permitting judicial reconsideration of
church decrees when fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness existed, nor
the Kedroff transformation of the Watson-Gonzalez doctrine to
constitutional status, altered the principle that civil courts cannot
decide issues of an essentially theological nature.57
Having invalidated Georgia's implied trust theory, or at least the
"departure from doctrine" element of it, the Court noted that the
first amendment does not dictate judicial deference to hierarchical
decisions in all religious property quarrels. Rather, "[t]here are
neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes,
which can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which prop-
erty is awarded."58 Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit
judicial interposition if the outcome is dependent upon resolution
of religious differences. 9 "Neutral principles" thus were not applied
in Hull Church, because even the review permitted by the Gonzalez
exceptions to Watson was exceeded by the state court's "departure
from doctrine" approach, an approach requiring an impermissible
probing of the challenged activities of the general church to ascer-
tain whether it deviated from the trust terms existing at the time
of the local church's affiliation. 0
Although the previously weakened implied trust theory thus was
abrogated conclusively, in his concurrence, Justice Harlan asserted
that the Court had not precluded civil courts' enforcement of consti-
tutionally permitted express trusts." As such, Hull Church af-
firmed a trend evident in Watson, Gonzalez, and Kedroff. More-
over, even though the permissible scope of review in church contro-
versies was not articulated precisely in Hull Church, the Gonzalez
exceptions of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness clearly remained
applicable, and "neutral principles of law" could be invoked to
review religious controversies involving separable property rights.2
57. Id. at 445-52.
58. Id. at 449.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 449-52.
61. 393 U.S. 440, 452 (Harlan, J., concurring).
62. An interesting postscript to the Hull Church controversy is that, on remand to the
Georgia Supreme Court, the general Presbyterian Church was divested of the property again.
The court determined that nullification of their "departure from doctrine" test invalidated
the "implied trust" theory as well. Because the separatist local churches held legal title to
the church property, they were deemed the legal owners. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern
Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041
(1970).
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A year later the Court again encountered a church property con-
flict. In Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God,63 commonly known as "Sharpsburg Church Case",
the Court considered the conflict between a regional church and the
local churches preparing to withdraw from it. Resolution of the con-
troversy required ascertaining the group that should manage the
church property. After examining the state statute controlling
church property,64 the relevant property deeds and corporate chart-
ers, and the General Eldership's constitution, the Maryland Court
of Appeals held for the separatist local churches." In a per curiam
opinion, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the regional
church's appeal; for, by applying "neutral principles of law," the
Maryland court had adjudicated the strife without delving uncon-
stitutionally into church tenets.6
Concurring in an opinion joined by Justices Douglas and Mar-
shall, 7 Justice Brennan expounded further on judicial deference to
ecclesiastical tribunals in the disposition of religious dissensions
implicating property rights. When such a dispute occurs, the state
has three options: (1) the Watson approach, as modified by
Gonzalez, which requires deference to hierarchical church decisions,
absent express trust provisions, fraud, collusion or arbitrariness and
permits congregational churches to resolve their own conflicts in
accordance with internal rules; (2) the "neutral principles of law"
or Hull Church approach which allows judicial application of the
"formal title" doctrine 6 and other rules of property law, to the
extent that they do not mandate civil court review of religious prac-
tices; and (3) the use of carefully drawn statutes as suggested in
Kedroff, which permits application of laws that are drafted to guar-
The Hull Church decision generated extensive commentary. See, e.g., Casad, supra note
21; Judicial Examination, supra note 10; Comment, The Role of Courts in Church Property
Disputes, 38 Mo. L. Rxv. 625 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Property Disputes]; 54 VA. L. REv.
1451 (1968).
63. 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam).
64. The Maryland Code provided that trustees elected by voting members of local churches
should control all churches (whether hierarchical or congregational), unless otherwise deter-
mined by local church constitutions. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 256-70 (1966 Repl. Vol.).
65. 249 Md. 650, 241 A.2d 691 (1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 528 (1969), aff'd,
254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969).
66. 396 U.S. at 368.
67. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. "Under the 'formal title' doctrine, civil courts can determine ownership by studying
deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws .... " Id. at 370.
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antee noninterference with religious tenets." Inasmuch as this de-
lineation of permissible judicial intervention apparently reflected
the views of only three members of the Court, and perhaps not the
convictions of the majority,70 greater specificity of the law was nec-
essary. Nonetheless, as evinced by the examination of prior case
law, some guidelines had emerged when in 1976 the Supreme Court
considered Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.
SERBIAN EASTERN ORTHODOX DIOCESE V. MILIVOJEVICH
Serbian Diocese arose out of a struggle for domination of the
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese.7' The Diocese, whose jurisdic-
tion includes the "entire political territory of the United States of
America and Canada,"" was a constituent part of the Serbian East-
ern Orthodox Church, an episcopal, hierarchical church maintain-
ing headquarters in Yugoslavia. In so far as the Diocese had its own
constitution and a Diocesan National Assembly, it possessed a mea-
sure of autonomy unknown to any other member diocese. This
American-Canadian entity, however, was subservient at all times to
the Mother Church, and answerable to the Belgrade-based legisla-
tive and executive authorities, the Holy Assembly of Bishops" and
the Holy Synod of Bishops,7" respectively.75
The dispute began in 1963 when Dionisije Milivojevich, the
Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese, was suspended from his
position. The following year, upon persisting in his antagonistic
actions, he was removed and defrocked by the Holy Synod. Prior to
69. Id. at 370, citing 344 U.S. 94 (1952). The Kedroff Court suggested, for example, that
statutes might regulate the disposition of the property of a charitable corporation that is
dissolved for unlawful practices, 344 U.S. at 120, or that failed in its charitable purpose. Id.
Similarly, statutes might govern the holding of property by religious corporations. 396 U.S.
at 367.
70. For additional commentary on Sharpsburg Church, see Property Disputes, supra note
62.
71. A diocese is an administrative unit of the Mother Church governed by a bishop. 96 S.
Ct. at 2376.
72. Id., quoting Art. 1 of the Constitution of the American-Canadian Diocese. This Diocese
is the only Serbian Eastern Orthodox diocese having its own constitution. Id.
73. The Holy Assembly of Bishops consists of the Bishops of all the dioceses, piloted by a
member chosen by the group as Patriarch. Possessing the highest legislative and judicial
powers, it, together with the Holy Synod of Bishops, has exclusive control over the appoint-
ment and dismissal of Bishops. Id. at 2375-76.
74. The Holy Synod of Bishops is composed of the Patriarch and four other members of
the Holy Assembly and acts as the supreme executive body for the Mother Church. Id.
75. Id. at 2376-78.
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his defrockment, however, the Holy Assembly divided the
American-Canadian Diocese into three units76 and appointed the
suspended Dionisije as Bishop of one of them. Dionisije refused to
recognize either his suspension or the reorganization and convened
a session of the Diocesan National Assembly at which the group
purported to declare its complete autonomy and to restore to its
constitution those sections which the Holy Assembly earlier had
eliminated."
Amidst this ecclesiastical power struggle, Dionisije brought suit
in an Illinois circuit court, asking to be declared the rightful Bishop
of the American-Canadian Diocese and seeking to enjoin both the
religious entity in this country and the newly appointed Bishops
from interfering with the assets of the church-established corpora-
tions." The circuit court held summarily for the Dionisije faction.
The Illinois Appellate Court, however, reversed and remanded after
concluding that, although the Mother Church possessed the power
to remove Bishop Dionisije, it lacked the authority to restructure
the diocesan boundaries."
Both sides appealed. Upon review of the constitutions of the
church bodies involved, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that
Dionisije's removal and defrockment had been arbitrary and proce-
durally improper, that the Mother Church lacked the requisite
power to reorganize the Diocese, and that the Diocese had no au-
thority to declare itself autonomous."0 That decision also did not
stand; thirteen years of state court litigation culminated in an ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of the United States. Denouncing Illi-
76. The boundaries of the three new dioceses corresponded roughly to those suggested by
Dionisije as part of his plan for a tripartite "Metropolia," which he intended to head. Id. at
2377.
77. Id. at 2376-78. A Serbian Orthodox Church in North America was first organized in
the early part of the 1900's. In 1927, the various congregations assembled to form the
American-Canadian Diocese and to draft a constitution. The Holy Assembly accepted the
draft subject to two pertinent changes: the Holy Assembly was to appoint the Bishops and
approve any constitutional amendments. Id. at 2376.
78. Under Illinois law, the American-Canadian Diocese in 1935 organized the respondent,
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, to hold the title both to the church property and to its
assets. In 1945, a monastery was incorporated, and title to certain property transferred to it.
Other property-holding corporations were organized under Pennsylvania and New York laws.
Id. at 2377. Dionisije, as Diocesan Bishop, controlled the incorporated monastery and held
the major position in the various secular corporations. Id. at 2380.
79. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Ocokoljich, 72 Ill. App.2d 444, 219 N.E.2d
343 (1966).
80. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill.2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268
(1975).
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nois' "intrusion into a religious thicket," the Court reversed the
final state court judgment.
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court first consid-
ered Dionisije's removal and defrockment. At issue was not a church
property conflict, although the position of Diocesan Bishop encom-
passed incidental property rights;8' rather, Dionisije's contested
status as a spiritual leader was a religious dispute concerning
power allocation within the ecclesiastical government.2 Only by as-
certaining who was entitled to the canonical office could the prop-
erty issue be resolved. An overview of the precedential development
of the doctrine of church and state separation manifested a common
theme: judicial interference in such religious matters, regardless of
underlying property disputes, contravenes the first amendment's
"free exercise" clause.83
Justice Brennan conceded, however, that prior case law, as exem-
plified by the Gonzalez exceptions of arbitrariness, fraud, and collu-
sion, evinced some deviation from this strict rule. Although these
never had been determinative of a Supreme Court case subsequent
to Gonzalez, 4 the Illinois Supreme Court's apparent reliance on the
"arbitrariness" exception to justify scrutiny of the church's internal
operations necessitated the Court's reconsideration of that excep-
tion. Upon reexamination the exception was deemed irreconcilable
with the first amendment prescriptions of judicial deference to ec-
clesiastical determinations rendered by church decisionmakers and
of secular noninterference in religious altercations;" for, the highest
tribunals of a hierarchical church cannot be accused of arbitrariness
for noncompliance with their own rules and customs. As such, the
constitutionally invalid arbitrariness test never can justify a judicial
investigation.
Nor are secular due process notions, such as "fundamental fair-
ness," relevant to decisions involving church doctrine and organiza-
tion. Determinations made by church leaders are exercises in discre-
tion to be accepted as a matter of faith. They are neither amenable
to nor assessable by objective standards. 6 Thus, the Illinois Su-
81. See note 77 supra.
82. Whether the American-Canadian Diocese had the authority to declare itself autono-
mous was not addressed by the Court.
83. 96 S. Ct. at 2380-81.
84. Id. at 2382.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2383.
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preme Court's "detailed review of the . . . proceedings resulting in
Bishop Dionisije's removal and defrockment" 7 was improper under
both the Constitution and precedent."8
The Court next rejected the Illinois court's holding, allegedly
based on the use of "neutral principles" of property law, that the
Mother Church had exceeded her powers in restructuring the
American-Canadian Diocese. The state's highest court had not
employed "neutral principles" as endorsed by the Hull Church and
Sharpsburg Church Courts. Rather, it allocated control of the con-
tested property according to its own reading of the constitutions of
the Mother Church and the American-Canadian Diocese, docu-
ments whose interpretations required impermissible examinations
of ecclesiastical doctrine. 9 Nor could general property law have
been applied to decipher the church property conflict. According to
the terms of the trust, although the bishop was in control of the
corporation, the church property was for the benefit of all diocesan
members. Thus, ascertaining the proper diocesan authority neces-
sarily preceded resolution of the property question.'"
Moreover, as partitioning the Diocese, an ecclesiastical adminis-
trative unit, is a matter peculiarly within the domain of the religious
organization, it is entitled to constitutional protection from secular
intervention.9 A civil court cannot substitute its decision for that
of the ecclesiastical government. Because the property issues were
thus intertwined too intricately with ecclesiastical affairs to permit
application of "neutral principles" of law, the reorganization of the
church was deemed permissible.
SERBIAN DIOCESE DIAGNOSED
The "arbitrariness" exception formulated in Gonzalez was re-
jected unequivocally in Serbian Diocese.This is a valid determina-
87. 60 Ill.2d at 503, 328 N.E.2d at 281.
88. "[U]nder the guise of 'minimal' review under the umbrella of 'arbitrariness,' the
Illinois Supreme Court has unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially
religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits exclusively to the
highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church." 96 S. Ct. at 2385.
89. Id. at 2386.
90. The "formal title" approach validated in Sharpsburg Church was inapplicable to the
facts of Serbian Diocese, for the resolution of the issues would not alter formal title, which
was held in trust by property-holding corporate entities for the collective membership of the
Diocese. Id. at 2387 n.15.
91. Id. at 2386. "[R]eligious freedom encompasses the power [of religious bodies] to
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as
those of faith and doctrine." Id., quoting 344 U.S. at 116.
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tion in that the broad scope of the exception would permit extensive
probing of most hierarchical church decisions so as to ascertain
whether a church had adhered to its own rules. If allowed to so
examine internal church decisionmaking procedures, civil courts
necessarily would become involved in determining issues relating to
church doctrine. Such interferences, regardless of objective inten-
tions, would contravene the first amendment protection of "free
exercise" and prohibition of "establishment" of religion.
The potential exploitation of the "arbitrariness" standard was
manifest in the lower court's procedure in Serbian Diocese. Invoking
the exception as a basis for intervention, the Illinois Supreme Court
reinstated a Bishop whom the Mother Church had indicted over
twelve years earlier for defiant and schismatic behavior.2 Further-
more, in so doing, the state court allowed Dionisije to skirt the
adjudicatory process established by the religious government and to
intitiate civil litigation even before removal and defrockment had
been decreed. 3 As noted previously, such secular involvement in
church concerns restricts the ability of the Church to operate inde-
pendent of state pressures, thus violating the prescriptions of the
first amendment.
Fraud and collusion, the Gonzalez exceptions not at issue in
Serbian Diocese, remain functional exceptions to the general rule of
Watson. But the actual value of these exceptions as checks on the
procedural guidelines of hierarchical churches is questionable in
that both are difficult to prove. Perhaps, then, no effective checks
on ecclesiastical rule exist, so that Justice Rehnquist's warning in
92. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that "the state trial judge...
was not the Bishop of Beauvais, trying Joan of Arc for heresy; the jurisdiction of his court
was invoked by petitioners themselves . . . ." In Justice Rehnquist's view, because both
factions recognized the civil court's jurisdiction, the court should be able to determine who
was rightfully the Bishop as well as adjudicate the property issue. 96 S. Ct. at 2388. This
argument has little merit. The civil suit was initiated by the respondents, and the petitioners
countersued only to protect their own interest. It would be anomalous to say petitioners thus
displayed desire to have civil courts adjudicate matters they felt should be resolved by
utilizing the procedures established by the hierarchical Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church.
93. Id. at 2378-79. The Court noted other grievous infractions of first amendment rights
committed in the name of arbitrariness. Acknowledging the hierarchical nature of the Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Church and recognizing the Holy Assembly's power under its own constitu-
tion to deprive a bishop of his position, the Illinois Supreme Court, nevertheless, examined
the defrockment procedures. Compounding its error, it delved into discordant testimony,
accepting the expert testimony of the respondents' sole witness and rejecting that of five
witnesses for the petitioners. In addition, the lower court did not acknowledge either the
importance of the canon law or its inconsistencies with the Church's constitution. Id. at 2383-
84.
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his dissent that civil courts might become "handmaidens of arbi-
trary lawlessness" 4 is a valid concern.
Undeniably, elimination of the "arbitrariness" exception accords
ecclesiastical bodies more independence. But increased independ-
ence need not result in decreased adherence to church regulations
or in arbitrary disregard of universal principles of fundamental fair-
ness. Although removal of such a check may facilitate a church's
elimination of threatening dissidents, it must be remembered that
religious organizations are voluntary affiliations established on a
common faith. 5 Moreover, whatever the effect, constitutional prin-
ciples must be followed; one such constitutional principle is that
secular dictation of church policy is more dangerous than ecclesiast-
ical disregard of due process doctrines. 6
In addition, the scope of secular review perhaps is not as restricted
as Justice Rehnquist portends and as Serbian Diocese ostensibly
suggests. If the American-Canadian Diocese had not constituted a
part of the hierarchy of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church, the
rules invoked by the Court would be inapplicable to the facts of
Serbian Diocese. According to the dissent, the existence of that
hierarchical relationship was at best on precarious grounds. 7 In a
concurring opinion, Justice White also expressed concern that the
majority may have failed to determine independently the hierarchi-
94. Id. at 2388 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. In various decisions, the Court has recognized explicitly the voluntary nature of reli-
gious affiliations: "All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to
this government, and are bound to submit to it." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729. "fIlt is the
essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as
matters of faith. ... 96 S. Ct. at 2383.
96. "[Unhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and implicating secular inter-
ests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern" are the inherent hazards of secular adjudica-
tion of religious disputes. 393 U.S. at 449.
97. "Here the underlying question . .. is . ..whether the members of the American-
Canadian Diocese had bound themselves to abide by the decisions of the Mother Church
.
.96 S. Ct. at 2391 n.*.
Even granting the establishment of a hierarchical relationship, the dissent would not have
applied the Watson rule of judicial deference to the supreme adjudicatory bodies of a hierar-
chical church: "[While common-law principles like those discussed in Watson, Bouldin,
and Gonzalez may offer some sound principles for those occasions when such adjudications
are required, they are certainly not rules to which state courts are required to adhere by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Id. at 2387.
Admittedly, Watson, Bouldin, and Gonzalez were not based on first amendment rights; the
Court in Hull Church, however, noted their constitutional status. 393 U.S. at 447. Moreover,
the Kedroff opinion explicitly raised Watson, as modified by Gonzalez, to constitutional
stature. See notes 45-46 supra & accompanying text.
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cal nature of the Church. 8 Yet the majority apparently did consider
the relationship existing between the Mother Church and its alleg-
edly independent offspring, as evidenced by the opinion's exten-
sive review of the development of both the Church and the Diocese.,,
In particular, the Court noted that the American-Canadian
constitution, though granting some autonomy to the unit, had failed
toremove the Diocese from the structural hierarchy of the Mother
Church;' 0 furthermore, on various occasions, Dionisije himself had
displayed subservience to the Yugoslavian based administration.','
The Court's conclusion that "the Serbian Orthodox Church is a
hierarchical and episcopal church," recognized as such by both
parties, therefore seems well grounded.'0
Thus, it was only after ascertaining the Church's structural for-
mation that the Court deemed applicable the Watson rule that
secular courts must defer to the decisions of the supreme adjudica-
tory bodies of a hierarchical church on matters ecclesiastical in
character, regardless of underlying civil rights. Thus, what appeared
in Watson to be an unambiguous, practically self-executing dictate,
is, in operation, a particularized rule limited to defined situations.
Unless a church clearly is hierarchical and accepted as such by both
disputants, the courts are required to ascertain not only the mor-
phology of the denomination, but also the status of the dissident
faction in relation to the alleged authoritative body. Should the
former be deemed a member of a hierarchical formation, then the
courts must ascertain what decision was rendered by the highest
98. "Major predicates for the Court's opinion are that the Serbian Orthodox Church is a
hierarchical church and the American and Canadian diocese, involved here, is part of that
church. These basic issues are for the courts' ultimate decision. ... 96 S.Ct. at 2387
(White, J., concurring).
99. A similar approach was taken by the Kedroff Court to determine the official relation-
ship between St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York and the Moscow based Russian Orthodox
Mother Church. See notes 42-44 supra & accompanying text.
100. See note 77 supra.
101. Upon his election as Bishop, Dionisije swore subservience to the Mother Church. 96
S. Ct. at 2383 n.9. As his Diocese expanded, he asked the Holy Assembly to provide him
assistant bishops. Id. at 2377. Finally, Dionisije sought the approval of the Mother Church
for a plan to elevate the American-Canadian Diocese to the status of a "metropolia." Id. See
also note 76 supra.
The Court found an implied recognition of the Mother Church in that the property-holding
corporations involved were formed under the section of the Illinois Religious Corporation Act
regarding religious organizations subordinate to larger church bodies. In addition, corporate
by-laws and all constitutional changes, inter alia, were submitted to the Mother Church for
approval. 96 S. Ct. at 2383 n.9.
102. Id.
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tribunal of the church.'"3 As Kedroff and Serbian Diocese suggest,
this requisite inquiry may entail not only secular scrutiny of church
history, customs, and laws, but also judicial interpretation of the
dissident faction's activites. As judicial review of ecclesiastical mat-
ters cannot be avoided entirely, clearer guidelines and limitations
must be propounded.
If the disputing factions are members of a congregational church,
effective guidelines are even more elusive. As in a hierarchical
church conflict, the Court will attempt to identify the proper gov-
erning body; that entity presumably is authorized to resolve the
doctrinal issues and the underlying property disputes. Yet, by defi-
nition, a congregational church lacks an authoritative summit; it
rarely has defined levels of rank. Rather, the conflicting groups are
generally of approximately equal status, and often represent equal
numbers. The Court in Watson had enunciated a seemingly simple
rule applicable in such controversies: If the principle of government
(in a congregational church) is that the majority rules, then the
numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of
the property. If there are within the congregation officers in whom
are vested the powers of such control, then those who adhere to the
acknowledged organism by which the body is governed are entitled
to the use of the property. 0 4
But this rule as well was only ostensibly simple. As Justice
Frankfurter noted in Kedroff, the "civil government under our con-
stitutional system .. .[will not] assure rule to any religious body
by a counting of heads,"'' 5 for democratic principles of majority rule
do not govern church administration. Only a year after Watson,
103. Because proof is needed to ascertain what decisions the ecclesiastical tribunal has
made, Justice Rehnquist contended that the courts should be permitted to examine church
adjudicatory procedures to insure the Church conforms with its own requirements. Id. at 2388.
The two issues are dissimilar. The religious tribunal would no doubt accommodate the courts
by articulating its ruling; inasmuch as the latter are bound by that decision, no further
inquiry is necessary or authorized. Moreover, an examination of ecclesiastical procedures
would seem not only futile, in that church adjudicatory bodies are not amenable to secular
due process principles, but also unconstitutional, for an investigation would chill, if not
violate, first amendment rights.
104. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 724-25. The Watson opinion continued:
The minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refus-
ing to recognize the authority of the governing body, can claim no rights in the
property from the fact that they had once been members of the church or
congregation. This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious opin-
ions . . ..
Id.
105. 344 U.S. at 122 (concurring opinion).
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when confronted in Bouldin with a congregational church struggle,
the Court itself realized the need to modify the rule. There the Court
held the majority congregation would prevail as stipulated in
Watson, but only "if they adhere[d] to the organization and to the
doctrine,"'' 6 thus requiring not only a counting of heads but also a
judicial determination of the religious entity's organizational and
doctrinal features.
The extensive investigation of ecclesiastical doctrine and its ad-
herents engaged in by the Court in Bouldin'"7 never has been over-
ruled nor has its scope been clarified or restricted. On the contrary,
Hull Church cited Bouldin in its discussion of permissible secular
review without distinguishing the different church structures in-
volved, that is, without noting that the church was congregational
in Bouldin and hierarchical in Hull Church.08 This, together with
Serbian Diocese's unqualified affirmance of Bouldin, might well
provide authority for future extended judicial probing of both con-
gregational and hierarchical churches, thereby undermining
Serbian Diocese's elimination of the "arbitrariness" exception.
THE PROGNOSIS OF SERBIAN DIOCESE: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE WITHOUT BOUNDARIES
Following the Supreme Court's 1871 pronouncement in Watson v.
Jones,' 9 under the doctrine of the separation of church and state,
civil courts were required to accept the ecclesiastical determinations
of church leaders, regardless of property right implications. More-
over, the first amendment provision mandating "free exercise" of
religion yet prohibiting "establishment" of religion supported this
general rule.
Because the Watson mandate was applied in divergent situations,
however, this rule of complete separation later was modified. Only
one year later, for example, the Court in Bouldin asserted that in
certain situations marginal civil court review was permissible and
even necessary. Subsequently, in 1929 in Gonzalez, the Court added
three exceptions to the Watson rule-fraud, collusion, and arbitrari-
ness-which authorized unprecedented secular review. Although
these exceptions were never determinative of a Supreme Court case,
106. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 140.
107. See note 25 supra.
108. 393 U.S. at 447 & n.6.
109. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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their potential applicability tainted the purity of the rule enunci-
ated in Watson.
By invalidating the "arbitrariness" check in Serbian Diocese, the
Court suggested at least a partial restoration of strict delineation
between church and state. Because, however, the Court unquali-
fiedly endorsed Bouldin, and not only refused to discuss the fraud
and collusion exceptions, but also failed to articulate the scope of
permissible secular intervention, the ultimate effect of the decision
is uncertain. Nonetheless, as indicated by an analysis of Serbian
Diocese in light of the Court's previous decisions involving church
disputes, some guidelines have emerged.
In Serbian Diocese, the Court cited favorably the Sharpsburg
Church concurrence"0 delineating three civil court approaches for
adjudicating church property disputes."' To resolve the controversy
before it, the Court employed one suggested option in modified
form, the Watson-Gonzalez-Kedroff approach"2 without the
"arbitrariness" exception: that is, under the first amendment "free
exercise" clause, they deferred to the determinations of the highest
adjudicatory body of the hierarchical church.
Although the Court in Serbian Diocese failed to discuss the appli-
cation of the special statutes approach," 3 it did consider another
option, the application of "neutral principles" of law as enunciated
in Hull Church, more specifically the "formal title" doctrine."' The
majority, however, rejected this procedure as inappropriate to the
given facts."' Nonetheless, reference to this option, together with
the general affirmation of Hull Church and Sharpsburg Church,
suggests that "neutral principles" is still a valid method for resolv-
ing conflicts concerning isolated property questions devoid of doc-
trinal interpretaton.
Because in Serbian Diocese the resolution of property matters was
woven intricately with church polity, however, the traditional prop-
erty concepts of implied and express trust were inapplicable. Appar-
ently Hull Church, in which the court pronounced the "neutral
110. See notes 67-69 supra & accompanying text.
111. Compare 96 S. Ct. at 2386-87 with 396 U.S. at 370 and 393 U.S. at 449-52.
112. "In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral . .. the Court converted the principle of
Watson as qualified by Gonzalez [which excepted fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness] into a
constitutional rule." 393 U.S. at 447.
113. See note 69 supra & accompanying text.
114. See note 68 supra & accompanying text.
115. See note 90 supra & accompanying text.
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principles" concept as endorsed in Serbian Diocese, conclusively
abrogated the implied trust theory; the express trust theory, re-
ferred to in Watson and reaffirmed in the Hull Church concurrence,
appears to have survived in spite of, or perhaps because of, its lack
of use.
Thus, some guidelines have emerged, suggesting boundaries for
the zone of church sanctity. Clearly, if a church condones human
sacrifices or attempts to punish crimes the Court would intervene
to stop the illegal act or the effort to punish secular crimes. Con-
versely, the Court will dismiss suits involving purely doctrinal strug-
gles seeking to establish the correct "belief." But if civil or property
rights are affected, secular courts are permitted limited review in
certain circumstances. Apparently the Court has endorsed two, pos-
sibly three, approaches to judicial resolution of such conflicts: abid-
ing by the decisions of adjudicatory bodies of hierarchical churches
and by the internal rules of congregational churches, applying neu-
tral principles of property law, and using special statutes regulating
church property that ensure secular noninterference. Fraud and col-
lusion are two additional grounds for judicial review of ecclesiastical
decisions. Serbian Diocese, however, eliminates the use of detailed
review of church doctrinal or disciplinary determinations merely on
the basis of "arbitariness." Nonetheless, the exact limits of author-
ized review remain unclear.
CONCLUSION
By eliminating the "arbitrariness" exception to the general rule
of Watson, Serbian Diocese, in one sense, strengthened the doctrine
of separation of church and state. In another sense, however, it may
have sanctioned extended reviews. On its facts, the outcome was
wise and proper. But its constitutional basis is deceiving, and ap-
pears to rest on precarious grounds. In the future, no doubt, it will
be tested against conflicting charges of according too much discre-
tion to religious tribunals, of providing too few limits on secular
intervention, and perhaps of operating to the detriment of such
constitutional rights as due process and fundamental fairness.
The failure in Serbian Diocese to articulate the extent of permissi-
ble secular intervention should not be confused with its conclusive
negation of the "arbitrariness" exception. Clarification of the hold-
ing is necessary; its boundaries must be circumscribed. But inas-
much as the "arbitrariness" exception violates the first amendment
"free exercise" clause, its abrogation aids in further delineating the
separate realms of church and state.
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